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Abstract—Dangerous goods transportation (DGT) represents
technological and environmental risks for exposed populations,
infrastructures and environment. Historical evidence has shown
that road-accidents in DGT can lead to various potential conse-
quences characterized by fatalities, injuries, evacuation, property
damage, environmental degradation, and traffic disruption. Due
to the importance of these products in everyday civil life activities
and the increase in demand for these materials, developing tools
for risk analysis and mitigation becomes a strategic goal in
particular in those countries, like France, in which the majority
of goods are transported by road. Based on the complexity
of the dangerous goods transportation system DGTS and its
related risk (factors that characterized risks are time dependent
as traffic conditions, weather conditions, incident probability
and population exposure), this analysis can only be made via
simulation. This paper describes a generic approach to use agent-
based modeling, an interesting approach to modeling systems
comprised of autonomous and interacting agents, for risk analy-
sis. It presents a novel generic model facet for representing risk
analysis and fault tree propagation in an agent model, where the
goal is to analyze the risk related to a system and to simulate
its behavior in normal and degraded mode by using multi-agents
systems. This approach is used to analyze the risks related to
dangerous goods transportation and to minimize these risks by
using agent-based model (identifying the best road that having
the minimum risk level for transport).
I. INTRODUCTION
Every day, dangerous goods (DG) are transported in differ-
ent modalities from one or more origins to their destinations,
all over the word, where people needs DG to live, to work,
but also to find out new frontiers. Every country needs DG
for everyday civil life activities: for example to use energy, to
transport goods and passengers, or simply to conduct a healthy
and safe life [1].
Dangerous goods transportation (DGT) includes all goods -
liquids, gasses, and solids - that include radioactive, flammable,
explosive, corrosive, oxidizing, asphyxiating, biohazardous,
toxic, pathogenic, or allergenic materials. All substances that
induce severe risk for health, that can harm people, environ-
ment and surrounding properties, or other living organisms,
are characterized as DG [2]. The severity of consequences
related to road-accidents in DGT and the large number of
lorries transported DG by day requires developing tools for
risk analysis and mitigation, where the risk is defined as
product event frequency and its consequences. These risks
might be characterized by different aspects as type and quantity
of dangerous goods, vehicle and road characteristics, traffic
and weather conditions and population density. Some of these
aspects are time dependent (traffic and weather conditions,
population density), which implies the complexity of such
analysis and encourages the use of simulation model. A
simulation model may be considered as a set of rules (e.g.
equations, flowcharts, state machines, cellular automata) that
define how the system being modeled will change in the future,
given its present state. Simulation is the process of model
execution that takes the model through (discrete or continuous)
state changes over time.
Many approaches may be used for Simulation modeling,
such as:
• System Dynamics (SD), developed by the electrical
engineer Jay W.Forrester in the 1950s [3]. It is mainly
continuous and is characterized by a high abstraction
level, low details and a strategic level;
• Discrete Event (DE), which roots back to 1960s
when Geoffrey Gordon conceived and evolved the
idea for General purpose simulation system (GPSS)
and brought about its IBM implementations [4]. This
model is mainly discrete and characterized by a middle
abstraction level, medium details and a tactical level
[5];
• Agent Based (AB), which is known by many names.
ABM (agent-based modeling), ABS (agent-based sys-
tems or simulation), and IBM (individual-based mod-
eling) are all widely used acronyms. These models
are essentially decentralized and preferred for complex
systems. They can range from high to low abstraction
levels [5].
As the analyzed system is time dependent, complex in terms of
multiplicity of units, decentralization of decision making, and
number of relationships between its components, then authors
will use an ABS.
In this paper, a generic model facet for representing risk
analysis and fault propagation in an agent model has been
proposed. This facet can be built in a systematic manner
from model based risk analysis and is made of the following
elements:
• a set of behavioral modes and an associated activity
model represented as an activity UML model.
• a set of events and a dysfunctional model represented
by a bow tie model.
• a set of transition rules to describe the interaction
between these models
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II gives a basic representation of the multi-agents
systems (MAS) and define the agents, their attributes and their
relations. Section III presents the proposed model, and explain
how to adapt a multi-agents system to risk analysis. Section IV
illustrates a proposed algorithm to mitigating risks related to
a DGT and shows for each agent class an agent-based model.
Finally, Section V concludes this paper.
II. MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM (MAS)
A. Definition of an agent
An agent is an independent entity with precise boundaries
and specific goals that exhibits autonomous behavior and has
both sensorial and communicational capabilities. It may have
incomplete information about its surroundings and limited
capacity to influence others.
In literature, a variety of definitions exist to describe what
an agent is ([6], [7]). One example, described in [7], defines
an agent as a physical or virtual entity :
• which is able to act in an environment and can
eventually reproduce,
• that can communicate directly with other agents,
• which is driven by a set of trends (in the form
of individual goals or function of satisfaction, even
survival), it seeks to optimize,
• which is able to receive (to a limited extent) its
environment,
• which may or may not have only a partial representa-
tion of this environment,
• which is expert and provides services and has its own
resources,
• whose behavior tends to meet its objectives, taking
into account the resources and expertise available to
it, and according to its perception, its representations,
and communications it receives.
B. Properties of an agent
The concept of agents is closely related to the object
oriented approach used in modern programming languages
such as Java or C++. Thereby an object is defined by its states
and behavior, whereas agents can be seen as objects with more
extended capabilities (e.g., rules of behavior, autonomy, co-
operation (e.g., perception, action, communication), mobility,
memory, learning ability, among others. Cooperation, which is
considered as a core capability of an agent, comprises, e.g.,
perception and action (interaction) and communication.
C. Definition of MAS
The multi-agent system is a software technology in
great demand to model and simulate the dynamic be-
havior of complex and decentralized systems, known as
Fig. 1. An Agent is in a mutual communication with its environment
Intelligentsystems. Historically, these systems are posi-
tioned at the intersection of programming (software), artificial
intelligence (decision-making autonomy) and distributed sys-
tems (decentralization).
Agent-based modeling (ABM) is is a micro-simulation tool
that recreates in a virtual context the interactions and behaviors
of a set of autonomous agents and their environment. This tool
considers that any system is made up of a set of entities agents
that interact amongst themselves and with an environment that
supports their very existence [8]. ABM is also considered
as upcoming approach in complex systems science to model
structures comprising autonomous and interacting elements.
Some scientists even denote this computer simulation based
modeling approach ”A New Kind of Science” and argue, that
besides deduction and induction, ABM and simulation is a
third way of doing science.
The basic idea of ABM is to model only the units - called
agents - of a specific system and to simulate their interplay in
order to derive and analyze the total system behavior.
Building an agent based simulation is composed of three
parts:
• Define the set of agents and the environment which
contains all agents: identify for each agent a set of
attributes, behavior modes, and resources, and for
the environment, its characteristics, responsibility and
functions;
• precise for each functions, its characteristics and at-
tributes;
• Specify the interactions in the system.
D. Environment
It provides the physical support for the agents live-ability
and interactions [9]. The environment of an agent j (Ωj) is
defined as the set of all elements or objects exterior to j. These
elements define a common space of action for agents. Figure 1
shows an agent that takes sensory inputs from its environment,
and produces as output actions that affect it.
E. Interactions between agents
Two types of communication can be observed for an agent
(see figure 2):
• agent-agent ( direct communication) : is carried in an
intentional way by sending messages to one or more
well defined recipients;
• environment-agent or indirect communication: is car-
ried either through the environment, not intentional ac-
tion, leaving traces or signals, or through a chalkboard
(intentional action) filing and reading information filed
in a shared data area. In this type of communication,
the recipients are not defined, they are all agents that
are in the vicinity of the agent sender.
Fig. 2. Agents interactions [5]
III. ABM FOR RISK ANALYSIS
To adapt the model-based agents to risk analysis, the
authors proposes some additional characteristics to a classical
agent as:
1) behavioral modes: described by a list of successive
blocks
2) failures modes: for expressing the risk and dysfunc-
tion analysis of system-agents
3) relationships between failure modes and behavioral
modes of system-agents.
Fig. 3. Generic Agent-oriented risk model (agent i)
Then they are used the Function interaction structure
modeling tool to model a multi-agent system, The structure
of each agent is composed of three views:
1) Structural view
2) Dysfunctional view
3) Behavioral View
A. Structural view
This part describes the structure of an agent, by showing
its relations with its environment (other agents) and the char-
acteristics of each of them.This basic view, allows us to enter
into the dysfunctional or behavioral view.
1) Structure of the agent: The basic element is the agent,
seen as an intelligent entity capable of interacting with its
environment and with other agents, execute tasks described
by an organized set of activities that use resources or agents
(personnel, equipment and machinery, ...) to transform from
input into output agents. It is described internally by:
• Structural elements that are defined with a list of
properties of accumulated resources and behavioral
rules.
The property list of an agent may contain:
◦ a type, that defines the class under which the
agent belongs;
◦ a name, which specifies the name to identify
the agent from the other agents in its environ-
ment;
◦ a list of variables or characteristics: for each
characteristic, define a name, a type and a
domain of validity.
The rules of behavior vary by agent. They include:
◦ The rules of sophistication
◦ The cognitive load
◦ The internal models of the external world
◦ The memory used
• The functional elements (FE), called activities or
tasks for an agent. An activity can be either active or
inactive at a given time t. Its behavior is characterized
by a set of variables, and eventually by a behavioral
model describing the temporal evolution.
Fig. 4. Relations activity
2) Links between activities and resources: Relationships
can take place between the functional elements of an agent
and other agents in its environment, which is necessary to
perform an activity (see figure 4). These relationships are of
three types:
• input relations : sometimes a number of agents is
requested in entering an activity. These agents are
either consumed or provide information that is used;
• outputs relations: other agents are either generated or
their status are changed, it is the case of a material
agent that is produced, or object that is assembled
agent;
• relationships of use: in this case, the agents are
considered supports for the function. For example, to
advance, a truck agent use a driver agent.
When an activity failure mode becomes active, the activity
takes dysfunctional inputs and provides dysfunctional outputs.
B. Dysfunctional view
Dysfunctional view describes the propagation of failure
between model elements. For example, a failure of an input
or support resources for an activity may cause the failure of
the activity or may produce an output resources in a degraded
state.
Two categories of failure sources can be observed:
1) Failure related to the activity: a failure of an input or
support agent for an activity cause the failure of the
activity;
2) Exterior failure related to others agents or to the
environment: where the agent receive a message
form its environment which indicates that a failure
occurred (it contains a description of the failure), this
message is stored in its inbox.
Each activity-failure mode is described by:
• a name;
• a set of events, causes for this mode, connected using
AND and OR gates represented in the fault tree and a
set of events ,consequences of the failure, representing
in the event tree;
• a time t representing the time to failure (TTF) of this
mode (for activity failure) .
• and a time TTR which presents the needed time to
repair the failure (once, current time begin equals TTF
+ TTR for a failure, this failure become inactive).
And each exterior failure is described by:
• a name;
• a Boolean value: when an agent receive a failure-
message from its environment, which contains the id
of the failure, this failure become true and when he
receive a reparation message with the id of failure
(repaired), the failure value becomes false.
Failure mode is denoted by fmodei. The normal mode of an
activity is defined as :
ok =
∧
i
¬fmodei (1)
Once, this view is built, we can define the set of failure
modes for each agent’s activity in the system. Afterward, we
add the set of exterior failure in order to obtain for each agent
a set of failure mode.
C. Behavioral view
This view describes the dynamic behavior of the agent.
Once, we have this view for all agent, it is possible to simulate
the operation of the system, in normal or degraded modes.
In addition, some elements of this view can be exploited for
diagnosis or prognosis [10].
1) Activity Diagram: The behavior of each agent is de-
scribed by an activity block diagram. For an agent, many
behavioral modes are possible, however, at a precise time
t, only one mode is active while the others are inactive. A
behavioral mode represent a program for the agent with many
input parameters. A mode has a current state (active, inactive)
which is updated in each step of the simulation. It may contain
many types of blocks:
• A start event block: This is the first block executed by
an agent, it indicates the existence of a new agent in
the environment;
• An end event block: This is the last block executed
by an agent, it indicates the end of life of an agent;
• An activity block called transformation activity :
this type of activity involves interaction between an
agent and its environment, and can lead to changes in
the characteristics of the agents and the environment.
It is defined by:
◦ a transformation relation :∑
nimei|φi..→
nsmes|φs
−→
∑
nomeo|φo{mi},
(2)
where mei is an input model element, required
in number ni and which must satisfy the condi-
tion φ, which a logical relation expressed with
respect to the variables, the attributes and the
events available in the scope. meo is an output
and mes is a model element representing a
support;
◦ a positive integer duration δ representing the
time
t = δ.Ts (3)
and/or a set of final conditions;
◦ a set of input/ outputs actions;
It is also possible for an interaction of this kind to
create new agents in the environment or kill existing
agents. This type of activity is sometimes complex.
We can decompose it into a list of simple activities.
• A gateway block: it used for testing the value of a
Boolean equation. Usually, this block is followed by
2 blocks, the first block is active when the equation is
true and the second is active when it is false.
• A block with many successors: this type of block is
used to represent the position of an agent that executes
more than one block after the execution of a block. In
this case, once the execution of the block is completed,
all successor blocks are activated .
• A block with many predecessors: this type of block is
used to represent the position of a block that is active
only when several blocks are already executed.
When a behavioral mode for an agent becomes active, we
execute its first block (usually the start event). We then identify
its successor block and check if it is an activity block. If
not, we propagate the activation. If the next block is of type
gateway we test its expression to determine its successors.
When a block has an activity block as successors, we test
all input and support elements (agents) of this activity block.
If they are all available, this activity block becomes active
running:
• we execute its input actions and make time t = current
time after we execute its task when t + duration of
block is less then current time;
• Once, current time = t + duration of block, we execute
the output actions of the block, we destroy its input,
we release its support and output agents, and this block
becomes inactive.
A behavioral mode of an agent is finished when we execute
its final block (end event).
D. Relations between dysfunctional and behavioral views
During the construction of a multi-agent model and after
defining the set of agents in the system, we define for each
agent:
1) a behavioral mode called nominal behavioral mode,
is defined (mode m1 in the figure 3);
2) a set of failure modes associated for each activity in
its nominal mode plus the set of exterior failures;
3) a set of failures modes which contains the set of
failure modes of all its activities;
Then, for each combination of failure mode for an agent, we
define a corresponding behavioral modes (see Figure 3) (for
example: when f1 becomes active, the behavioral mode for
the agent change from M1 to M3 and when it receive a failure
message from its environment, its behavioral mode becomes
M2).
Now, for each agent in the environment, they have:
• a set of variables;
• a set of behavioral modes: with one representing
the normal mode (defined by default) and the others
representing the dysfunctional modes;
• a set of failure modes;
• a set of relations between the dysfunctional and be-
havioral mode;
The number of behavioral modes of an agent may be up to
2n where n: is the number of its failure modes. The number
is, however, usually much less as a same behavior mode is
associated to several failure modes.
E. Transition rule from a mode to another
At each step in the simulation, a test is carried out on
the entire agent failure modes (activity failure and received
messages in its inbox). This allows us to identify which failure
modes should be true in the next step. Based on the value of
each failure mode, we can determine if the current behavioral
mode remains active for the next step or replace it by another
mode. If it is to be replaced, we must stop all running activities
that correspond to the old mode and activate the first block in
the novel mode.
Figure 3 shows an agent that has a normal behavioral mode
m1. In this mode, there is an activity Activity1 which has two
failure modes: the first is related to the activity and represented
by a fault tree (with time to failure equals TTF) and the other
one is exterior failure mode. Once, a failure mode become
active, if it is the activity failure mode, the behavioral mode
of the agent becomes m3 and Activity1 becomes inactive, it is
possible that M1 returns active when the current time = TTF
+ TTR. Else, if it is an exterior failure, the behavioral mode of
the agent becomes M2 and Activity 1 becomes inactive. It is
also possible that the agent behave according to m1 when the
agent receive a message repaired. So finally, for each failure
mode, there is a corresponding behavioral mode.
IV. ABM FOR OPTIMIZING AND MITIGATING DGTR
The use of agent technology for the study of freight
transport systems is relatively recent, with the first publications
dating back to the 1990s [11]. An early attempt to use ABM
principles in solving transport-related problems was conducted
by [12]. The purpose of the work was to minimize the expected
total risk as defined by the multiplication of the accident
probability and its severity (number of exposed people). The
reviewed literature and the analysis of the case study provided
information about the agents involved in the identification
of the best road. A total of seven agents were identified:
truck (i), driver, provider weather conditions, provider Segment
characteristics, provider traffic conditions, provider population
and provider dangerous goods characteristics.
The authors supposes that minimizing these risks can be
achieved in two steps:
1) identify the best road (prior optimization): precise
which road has the minimum level of risk, by ap-
plying, for each of possible road, the following algo-
rithm:
• simulate an advancement of the truck for a
time delta t, and identify its position after the
advancement;
• calculate the probability of an accident during
the advancement according to the dynamic
parameters: weather and traffic conditions;
• calculate the severity of the accident: evaluate
its severity (number of exposed people);
• return to step 1 until reach the destination.
The expected total risk for a road is defined as:
Risque = P1×G1 +
n−1∑
j=2
j−1∏
i=1
(1−Pi)×Pj×Gj (4)
where:
Pi: probability of an accident that occurred during
advancement number i;
Gj : severity of the accident that occurred during
advancement number i;
and N: number of advancement.
As Results, there are for each road the risk level and
the expected travel time, and the best road is that
has the minimum risk level. Figure (5) presents the
behavioral mode related to the truck agent, where
the authors considers that at each advancement an
accident occurs, the time to reparation TTR is equals
0, figure 6 shows the relations of the moving activity
and figure 7 illustrates the relations of the activity
calculating the severity. It is important to notice that
more than one road can be best road and a change in
the departure time may change the best road). This
step is also named prior optimization because the
optimal road is chosen before the travel begins.
Fig. 5. Agent based model for truck
Fig. 6. Relations of Moving activity
Fig. 7. Calculating the severity of the accident
2) minimize effects: after identifying the best road to
travel, the travels begins. Here, some agents are added
in the simulation as agent operators (o), control center
(k), secour (s) and vehicle (j). The interaction and
communication between agents appears explicitly.
The authors suppose that an agent A can commu-
nicate with other agent B if the distance between
them is less then or equals to a distance d, and during
its advancement, a truck is always in communication
with at least one control center in which the agent
control center have a complete information of the
position of the truck and its content at each time t.
At first, all agent behaves in their normal behavioral
modes, vehicle and truck move in a map according
to their behavioral modes. During the advancement,
an accident can occurs on a truck or a vehicle.
When an accident occur on a truck, its behavioral
mode change from m1 to m2 and it send directly a
message to the control center and the nearest operator
and send another broadcasts message to all agents
(vehicles or trucks) in its area to inform them about
the accident (see figure 9). Once, the control center
receives the message, it change its behavioral modes
and sends a notification message to the closest secour
which contains information about the incident and
its position (see figure 12). In turn, secour change
its behavioral modes and moves to the position to
evacuate people from the dangerous area to another
safe (isolate) area and operator change its behavioral
modes and moves to the position to repair the failure
(see figure 10). When, operator finishes its tasks,
it returns to its old behavioral mode and it sends
a message repaired to the truck (see figure 8) and
when secour evacuate all people, it returns to its
old behavioral mode and sends a message Ok to
the control center which in turn returns to its old
behavioral modes. When a vehicle or a truck receive
the broadcast message, it change its behavioral mode
from m1 to m2 and its treat the message: if its is an
old message or a message already received , it do any-
thing (to avoid recursive or inappropriate messages)
else it broadcasts the message in its environment and
it test if the position of the accident is in its trajectory,
it changes its direction if not, it continues normally.
In the other case, when a failure occur on a vehicle
(figure 11), it send a message to the nearest operator
to repair its failure and sends another broadcast mes-
sage in its environment. Once, the operator receive
the message, it move towards the vehicle (the authors
considers that the time in route is equals 0). When it
finish the reparation, it sends a message repaired to
the vehicle which continues its trajectory. Figure 13
shows the relations of the activity advancement truck,
and figure 14 illustrates the relations of advancement
vehicle activity.
The autonomy and the intelligence of agents provides
many benefits to the system as: when a truck or
vehicle receives a message, they broadcasts it if and
only if it is an important message, this methodology
minimize the size of sending message and the used
memory, also these agents are able to identify the best
route when an accident occurs in their trajectory. And
finally, exchanged messages between agents lead to a
rapid intervention by the agents secours and operators
in the case of accident which can minimize the effects
related to it.
Fig. 8. Agent-based model of the operators
Fig. 9. Agent-based model of the trucks
Fig. 10. Agent-based model of the secours
Fig. 11. Agent-based model of the vehicles
For shipping dangerous goods from Grenoble to Lyon,
many roads can be used. In this example, the authors take
count two roads (road 1 and road 2, road 2 is longer than road
1). To identify the best road between them, they are used the
algorithm cited in section IV. Figure 15 illustrates for each
road the number of people affected at each advancement (4
minutes). It appears that between time 0 and 44, the number
of people impacted at the road 1 is bigger than that impacted at
road 2 and from time 44 to 48, the number of impacted people
at road 2 is the biggest. Figure 16 shows at each advancement
Fig. 12. Agent-based model of the control center
Fig. 13. Relation of advancement truck activity
Fig. 14. Relation of advancement vehicle activity
Fig. 15. Number of exposed people
the hazardous areas (two hazardous areas can be observed:
area of lethal effects and area of irreversible effects).
After computing the expected total risk for these roads, it
appears that road 2 has the minimum level of risk and it is
used in the transport.
The next step after identifying the best road is to start
Fig. 16. Affected areas
the travels. Now, the second step in the section IV is used to
minimize and manage risks.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a new approach for risk analysis based on
multi-agents have been presented. For each agent in the system,
there is generic model which contains a set of activities,
attributes, failure modes and behavioral modes. The main
interest of this meta model is that it allows the representation
of risk analysis and dynamical behavior in a coherent manner,
which can be used to simulate the behavior of a system in
normal or degraded conditions. This was used to evaluate
and minimize the level of risk related to dangerous goods
transportation throughout an example of a moving of a truck
agent loaded with hazardous materials. As future goals, for the
same example illustrated in this paper, it is possible to treat
the existence of failure agents, which sent wrong messages
and how the others agents can discover them. Also this model
can be applied to a system containing a large number of active
agents as evacuation system.
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